Abstract A pay-TV consumer uses a decoder to access encrypted digital content. To this end, a decoder contains a chip capable of decrypting the content. The recently standardized K-LAD key establishment protocol can be used to secure the delivery of content decryption keys to the chip. This paper presents a new key establishment protocol. The paper shows how the new protocol can be applied in a pay-TV system, and provides a comparison of the properties of the new protocol and the K-LAD protocol. In particular, it is shown that the new protocol offers a similar level of security as the K-LAD protocol against attacks in which content decryption keys are compromised and re-distributed. An advantage of the new protocol compared to the K-LAD protocol is that the trusted third party in the new protocol manages a public master key of each decoder instead of a secret master key of each decoder. Compared to K-LAD, this simplifies key management and reduces the level of trust required in the trusted third party. In addition, the new protocol achieves the desirable property that a decoder needs to be revoked only if its chip is compromised. This reduces the risk that the decoder of an honest consumer needs to be revoked to restore system security.
Introduction
In a pay-TV system, the pay-TV provider's head-end system encrypts the content before broadcasting it, and a consumer uses a decoder capable of decrypting the content in order to access it. To this end, a decoder contains a chip that implements the content decryption algorithm; this chip is also referred to as the content decryption chip in this paper. Examples of a decoder are a set-top box or a PC Card in case of a Common Interface (CI) or CI Plus module [2, 3] . After decrypting the content, the decoder passes the content to a device that renders the content; a television is a typical example of a content rendering device.
A pay-TV provider uses a Conditional Access (CA) system to control access to the content, thereby ensuring that only authorized decoders have access to the keys required to decrypt the content. A CA system consists of CA components in the head-end system of the pay-TV provider and a CA client in each decoder associated with the provider. The CA components generate messages to authorize decoders, and the CA client of an authorized decoder passes content decryption keys, referred to as control words in a pay-TV system, to the content decryption chip in the decoder. A CA client may be implemented in a hardware module that is detachable from the decoder, such as a smart card. Alternatively, a CA client may be implemented as a readproof and tamper-resistant software module executed on a general-purpose processor integrated in the decoder. It is generally possible to update the CA client in a decoder, e.g. to enhance the decoder's functionality or to correct a security breach. To this end, a new hardware module may be distributed to the decoder or a new software module may be downloaded to the decoder. A number of different CA system suppliers exist, each of-fering their own proprietary CA system. Although it is possible for a pay-TV provider to use multiple CA systems in their operation, the provider typically uses only one CA system to increase the level of system security and/or to decrease the operational complexity.
One of the biggest threats to the security of a pay-TV system is an attack in which an adversary compromises and re-distributes control words, enabling nonauthorized access to the corresponding content. It is generally easy for an adversary to read messages passed from the CA client to the content decryption chip in a decoder, or to inject messages into this channel. For these reasons, a cryptographic protocol is used to transport control words from the CA client to the content decryption chip. A content decryption chip generally implements steps of a protocol that can be used by any CA system to secure the transport of control words to the chip. In current deployments, a CA system supplier initializes the chip with a secret master key, also referred to as the secret master key of the decoder in the following text, to enable the CA system of the supplier to execute the protocol with the chip.
There are several scenarios in which it would be useful to replace the CA client in a deployed decoder with a CA client associated with a different CA system supplier. For example, a pay-TV provider may want to replace the CA client to reduce costs and/or to increase the level of security. It may also be necessary to replace the CA client if the corresponding CA system supplier discontinues business. In addition, a consumer may want to use a decoder associated with a pay-TV provider to access content broadcast by another pay-TV provider using a different type of CA system. For example, the consumer may want to use the decoder to concurrently access content of multiple pay-TV providers or the consumer may want to use the decoder after moving to a location serviced by another pay-TV provider.
The scenarios described above require that the new type of CA system is able to execute the protocol with the content decryption chip in the decoder. However, this chip may not have been initialized by the new CA system supplier. For example, the new CA system supplier may have started their business after the chip was initialized. If the new CA system supplier did not initialize the chip, then in theory the new CA system supplier could use the master key of the decoder associated with a CA system supplier that did initialize the chip. However, there is generally no trust relation between different CA system suppliers. The new CA system supplier may therefore not be able or willing to use the protocol that secures the transport of control words from their CA system to the chip. In other words, in many instances it may be necessary to replace a deployed decoder if the pay-TV provider wants to replace the CA client. Similarly, in many instances it may be necessary for a consumer to acquire a new decoder in order to access content broadcast by another pay-TV provider. Replacing a decoder or acquiring a new decoder are expensive operations compared to replacing only the CA client in a deployed decoder, especially if the CA client is a software module that can be downloaded to the decoder.
The K-LAD key establishment protocol presented in [10] addresses these points. That is, the K-LAD protocol is agnostic to both the CA system and the pay-TV provider in that: (1) a pay-TV provider can use a decoder with a K-LAD compliant content decryption chip with any K-LAD compliant CA system, and (2) a consumer can use such a decoder to access content of any pay-TV provider that uses a K-LAD compliant CA system. The K-LAD protocol does not require a trust relation between CA system suppliers or between pay-TV providers. In K-LAD, a trusted third party initializes the content decryption chip with a secret master key and the trusted third party manages this key during the lifetime of the corresponding decoder.
Decoders implementing a protocol that is both CA system and pay-TV provider agnostic like K-LAD, may be sold to a customer through a retailer without any involvement of either a CA system supplier or a pay-TV provider. Alternatively, such a decoder may be integrated into a content rendering device, allowing any pay-TV provider to service the device using any compliant CA system and avoiding the need for a separate decoder.
This paper presents a new key establishment protocol that enables a sender and a number of receivers as selected by the sender to derive a shared secret. The new protocol provides implicit key authentication in that the sender is assured that only the receivers selected by the sender have access to the shared secret, and the protocol protects the authenticity of protocol messages in that it is computationally infeasible to find protocol messages that enable a non-selected receiver that is compliant with the protocol to derive a given shared secret. Further, the protocol is sender agnostic in that any sender can execute the protocol with any receiver and no trust relation between senders is assumed. In addition, a receiver needs to be revoked only if the receiver's system is compromised, as a breach in any other system component can be corrected without revoking the receiver. A trusted third party acts as a certification authority in the new protocol, managing a public master key of each receiver.
This paper also provides examples of how the new protocol can be applied in a pay-TV system, and com-pares properties of the new protocol and the K-LAD protocol. As is the case with K-LAD, a decoder that is compliant with the new protocol is agnostic to both the CA system and the pay-TV provider, and the new protocol does not require a trust relation between CA system suppliers or between pay-TV providers. It is shown that the new protocol offers a similar level of security as the K-LAD protocol against control word redistribution attacks. An advantage of the new protocol compared to the K-LAD protocol is that the trusted third party manages a public master key of each decoder instead of a secret master key of each decoder. This simplifies key management and reduces the level of trust required in the trusted third party. In addition, the new protocol achieves the desirable property that a decoder needs to be revoked only if its chip is compromised. This reduces the risk that the decoder (or the content rendering device if the decoder is integrated in the device) of an honest consumer needs to be revoked to restore system security.
Organization of the paper: Section 2 contains preliminaries related to a pay-TV system, including the basics of a CA system, the K-LAD protocol and the CI and CI Plus standards. The new protocol is presented in Sect. 3. That section also details properties of the protocol and describes the role of the trusted third party. Section 4 presents examples of how the new protocol can be applied in a pay-TV system. Properties of the new protocol and the K-LAD protocol are compared throughout Sect. 4. Finally, concluding remarks can be found in Sect. 5.
Preliminaries

Basic concepts of a pay-TV system
This section describes aspects of a pay-TV system that are relevant to this paper. This paper assumes without loss of generality that the pay-TV system is compliant with the widely adopted Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) standard (www.dvb.org). For general information about digital television and the DVB standard, refer to [1] . Figure 1 depicts the basic components of a DVB pay-TV system. The pay-TV provider operates a headend system and a consumer uses a decoder to access content broadcast by the provider. Without loss of generality, only one decoder is depicted Fig. 1 . To protect content, denoted by C in Fig. 1 , it is encrypted inside the head-end system before it is broadcast. To this end, DVB defines a symmetric encryption algorithm referred to as the Common Scrambling Algorithm (CSA). The
specification of CSA can be obtained from the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI); however, ETSI only makes the specification available to bona-fide users and under a non-disclosure agreement. A CSA key is referred to as a control word and denoted by K in Fig. 1 . The key length of the most recent version of CSA, referred to as CSA v3, is 128 bits [7] . Throughout the paper, the key of a keyed cryptographic operation is written as a subscript; for example, the encryption of C using the CSA encryption operation and control word K is denoted by CSA K (C). The corresponding decryption operation CSA −1 is implemented inside the content decryption chip integrated in the decoder. Typically, a control word is updated every 5 to 10 s.
A CA system ensures that only authorized decoders can access content; that is, a CA system ensures that only authorized decoders have access to the control words required for decrypting the content. As shown in Fig. 1 , the CA system comprises CA components in the head-end system and a CA client in each decoder. The DVB standard does not specify the CA system itself. Consequently, a number of different CA system suppliers exist, each offering their own proprietary CA system. However, DVB has defined a head-end system architecture, referred to as the DVB SimulCrypt standard [8, 9] . This standard identifies the logical components in the head-end system and it specifies the interfaces between these components. In particular, in the SimulCrypt standard the head-end system implements the CSA encryption algorithm and a Random Number Generator (RNG) to generate control words, which are supplied as input to CSA and to the CA components at the head-end (see also Fig. 1 ). An important property of SimulCrypt is that this architecture enables the use of multiple CA systems in the head-end system, each protecting the same encrypted content. Observe that such interoperability between two or more CA systems is only possible if all these CA systems use the same version of CSA. The interoperation of CA systems at the head-end enables a provider to service a decoder that uses a CA client associated with any of these CA systems and avoids the need for broadcasting the same content multiple times. For example, interoperating CA systems can be used after the operations of two pay-TV providers using different types of CA systems have been merged. Without loss of generality, only one CA system is depicted in Fig. 1 .
Further, in [7] DVB defines two types of CA messages that can be sent from the CA components to a CA client. The first type of CA message is an Entitlement Management Message (EMM); an EMM is typically used to authorize a decoder to access a specific piece of content. The second type of CA message is an Entitlement Control Message (ECM); ECMs are used to distribute control words to CA clients of authorized decoders. The size of an ECM and the size of an EMM are bounded above by 256 bytes [7] . The DVB standard does not specify the contents of these messages; in other words, the contents of these messages are proprietary to the CA system. This paper assumes throughout that a CA system implements measures to protect the confidentiality and/or the authenticity of sensitive information contained in a CA message.
The CA components at the head-end generate the CA messages before broadcasting the encrypted content and the CA messages to the decoders. Examples of the transmission medium used for broadcasting information from a head-end system to the decoders are a satellite, a cable, or a terrestrial network. An important property for the protocols described in this paper is that an electronic return channel from a decoder to the head-end system may not be available in a pay-TV system, in particular if a satellite or terrestrial network is used. This paper therefore assumes that such a return channel is not available.
There is usually a limited amount of bandwidth available for sending CA messages in a pay-TV system, as a pay-TV provider prefers to use as much of the available bandwidth as possible for broadcasting content. In particular, it is not possible to distribute a uniquely encrypted message to every authorized decoder for every control word K (recall that K is updated every 5 to 10 s). To address this, a CA system can implement a method based on broadcast encryption as introduced in [5] . Protecting the distribution of a control word using broadcast encryption is bandwidth efficient compared to using a unique encryption for every decoder, while still ensuring that only CA clients of authorized decoders can access the control word.
The CA client in a decoder processes EMMs and ECMs. If the decoder is authorized to access content associated with a specific ECM, that is, if the CA client in the decoder has received and processed an EMM authorizing the decoder to access the content associated with this ECM, then the CA client derives the control word from the ECM. Next, the CA client passes the control word to the content decryption chip in the decoder. A practical example of a CA system can be found in [14] .
Control word re-distribution attacks
In a control word re-distribution attack an adversary first compromises control words, e.g. by extracting control words from an authorized decoder. Next, the adversary re-distributes the control words to pirate decoders that have access to the pay-TV provider's broadcast. Notice that it is particularly easy for a pirate decoder to access the provider's broadcast if the provider uses a satellite or terrestrial network. A pirate decoder then uses the encrypted content in the broadcast and the re-distributed control words as inputs to its implementation of CSA −1 to illegally access content in realtime. For an adversary, re-distributing control words is more attractive than re-distributing content: a control word is a short message that is updated every 5 to 10 s while the bit-rate of a single, high-quality video stream is around 4 megabits per second. Control word re-distribution is currently one of the biggest threats to the security of pay-TV systems.
The content decryption algorithm CSA −1 may only be implemented after obtaining a license from ETSI. This makes it possible to suppress illegal implementations of CSA −1 . Further, CSA is a DVB-confidential cipher and CSA v3 contains an emulation resistant algorithm (see also [7] ). These measures make it difficult for an adversary to use pirate decoders containing illegal implementations of CSA −1 in a control word redistribution attack.
However, it is generally easy to access the channel from the CA client to the content decryption chip in a decoder containing a legitimate implementation of CSA −1 (see also Fig. 1 ). In particular, if this channel is unprotected, then an adversary may compromise control words when they are passed from the CA client to the chip, or the adversary may inject compromised control words into this channel, using the decoder as a pirate decoder.
In practice, the channel from the CA client to the content decryption chip is therefore protected using a cryptographic protocol. Such a protocol provides implicit key authentication in that only the content decryption chips of authorized decoders have access to the control word. However, the adversary may still be able to compromise a control word in other ways, e.g. by extracting it from the CA client or from the content decryption chip of an authorized decoder. The authenticity of protocol messages can be protected to prevent the adversary from finding one or more protocol messages that enable a content decryption chip of a nonauthorized decoder that is compliant with the protocol to derive a compromised control word. In general, an adversary will not be able to use a decoder as a pirate decoder in a control word re-distribution attack if the content decryption chip in the decoder only accepts authentic protocol messages, even in case the values of the control words are known to the adversary. In other words, this measure reduces the number of legitimate CSA −1 implementations that an adversary can use in a control word re-distribution attack.
As an example, consider an attack in which a consumer acquires a low-value subscription package from a pay-TV provider and in which the consumer uses the decoder and re-distributed control words to illegally access other content broadcast by the provider. To prevent such attacks, even in the case that the corresponding control words have been compromised, the pay-TV provider can decide to use only decoders with a content decryption chip that only accepts authentic protocol messages.
The main objective of the key establishment protocols described in this paper is to secure the channel from the CA client to the content decryption chip in a decoder, providing implicit key authentication and protecting the authenticity of protocol messages. Due to bandwidth limitations in a pay-TV system, bandwidth usage of the corresponding CA messages is an important aspect of the protocols.
A symmetric key establishment protocol
This section describes a key establishment protocol as used in pay-TV systems. The setting considered in this paper is that multiple receivers are associated with one sender. The protocols enable the sender and a number of receivers selected by the sender to derive a shared secret K. A receiver selected by the sender is referred to as an authorized receiver in the following text.
In the following protocol description, the keys M K B and LK B are associated with a symmetric encryption algorithm (e.g. AES [19] ) and the encryption and decryption operations are denoted by e and d, respectively. This paper assumes throughout that an adversary cannot break the cryptographic primitives as used in the protocols. Further, for ease of exposition and without loss of generality, the paper assumes throughout that the value of each key that is generated in a protocol is unique in the system. 
The initialization step in Protocol 1 is a one-time setup of the scheme. The remainder of the protocol is divided into two similar phases: in Phase I the sender uses the secret master keys of the receivers to transport a long-term key to each receiver, and in Phase II the sender uses the long-term keys to transport a shared secret to each authorized receiver. In practice, Phase II is executed a number of times after Phase I is executed, and the sender can select any set of authorized receivers for every execution of Phase II. This paper assumes that a new long-term key is transported to every receiver associated with A in Phase I. Instead, new long-term keys can be transported to a subset of these receivers, and all other receivers can use a long-term key in Phase II that was transported in one of the earlier executions of Phase I.
Protocol 1 protects the confidentiality of the shared secret K. Moreover, a non-authorized receiver B ′ can only successfully retrieve long-term keys that were encrypted using M K B ′ , and as a consequence, B ′ can only successfully retrieve shared secrets that were encrypted using one of the keys LK B ′ . Further, under the assumption that the value of K is unique for every execution of Phase II, the sender did not generate e LK B ′ (K) in any of the protocol executions. This assures the sender that only authorized receivers have access to the shared secret K; in other words, the protocol provides implicit key authentication. In addition, given a shared secret K, it is computationally infeasible to find protocol messages that enable a non-authorized receiver B ′ to derive K as long as the values of LK B ′ as generated in Phase I and the value of M K B ′ are unknown. In other words, the protocol protects the authenticity of protocol messages.
Application in pay-TV systems
In a pay-TV system, sender A comprises a CA system and the RNG in the head-end system, receiver B is a content decryption chip in a decoder associated with A, and K is a control word generated by A. If multiple CA systems interoperate at the head-end, then each of these CA systems executes the protocol independently with the chips of the decoders in their operation, with the exception of Step 5, which is shared between all these CA systems.
Step 5 of the protocol is performed inside the headend system, where K is used to encrypt content (see also Fig. 1 ). Recall from Sect. 2.1 that K is distributed from the CA components to the CA clients using an ECM. This distribution is not mentioned in Protocol 1, as the CA components and the CA clients are both part of the sender in Protocol 1. After receiving the ECM, the CA clients of authorized decoders derive K from the ECM and perform Step 6a. Next, the CA client associated with chip B passes the value e LKB (K) to B in Step 6b.
The value e MKB (LK B ) is generated uniquely for every chip B in Step 1b. Recall from Sect. 2.1 that due to bandwidth limitations it is not possible to distribute a uniquely encrypted message to every decoder for every control word. However, the values e MKB (LK B ) are only generated during the execution of Phase I of the protocol, and not every 5 to 10 s in case of a control word. This makes it feasible to distribute the values e MKB (LK B ) from the head-end system to the CA clients. Steps 1a and 1b can therefore be performed by the CA components at the head-end. Next, the value e MKB (LK B ) is distributed to the CA client associated with B, along with a copy of LK B to enable the CA client to perform Step 6a. This distribution can be done using an EMM, and is not mentioned in Protocol 1, as the CA components and the CA clients are both part of the sender. After receiving e MKB (LK B ), the CA client passes this value to B in Step 1c.
Observe that it would be possible to use a simpler variant of the protocol in which the secret master key M K B is distributed to the CA client associated with chip B. Next, if the decoder is authorized, then the CA client derives K from the ECM, computes e MKB (K) and passes this value to the chip. Finally, the chip can compute K = d MKB (e MKB (K)). Note that a compromise of M K B implies that the channel from the CA system to chip B can no longer be protected, and that M K B needs to be available to the CA client in this variant. It is generally more difficult to compromise a key from a head-end system than to compromise a key from a CA client, because it is usually easy for the adversary to obtain a CA client and the low cost of a CA client limits its security level. For these reasons pay-TV systems generally do not use this simpler variant of the protocol.
The K-LAD protocol
This section describes aspects of the K-LAD protocol that are relevant to this paper.
In current deployments, a CA system supplier performs the initialization step of Protocol 1, initializing each chip B with its secret master key M K B and distributing this key to the CA components of the pay-TV provider. The CA system supplier typically implements physical security measures to protect the confidentiality of secret keys in the CA components at the head-end. This prevents that the value of M K B is known to any other party in the system.
If the pay-TV provider wants to replace the CA client in a deployed decoder with a CA client associated with a different CA system supplier, then the new type of CA system should be able to execute the protocol with the chip in the decoder. If the chip was not initialized by the new CA system supplier (for example, the new CA system supplier may have started their business after the chip was initialized), then in theory the new CA system supplier could use the master key of the decoder associated with a CA system supplier that did initialize the chip. However, there is generally no trust relation between different CA system suppliers. The new CA system supplier may therefore not be able or willing to use the protocol that secures the transport of control words from their CA system to the chip. In other words, this application of Protocol 1 is not CA system agnostic.
In theory, a pay-TV provider could initialize each chip with a secret master key, thereby avoiding the need for exposing its value to a CA system supplier. The pay-TV provider can then provide the secret master keys of the chips as input to the CA components at the headend, resulting in CA system agnostic solution. However, there is generally no trust relation between different pay-TV providers. That is, a pay-TV provider that did not initialize the chip in a decoder (for example, this pay-TV provider may have started their business after the chip was initialized) may not be able or willing to use this decoder in their operation. In other words, this application of Protocol 1 is not pay-TV provider agnostic.
The K-LAD protocol addresses these points in that the K-LAD protocol is CA system agnostic and pay-TV provider agnostic. K-LAD uses a trusted third party to manage the secret master key of each decoder, thereby avoiding the need for exposing their values to a CA system supplier or to a pay-TV provider. The initialization step in K-LAD uses three keyed cryptographic operations, denoted by f (1) , f (2) and f (3) in the following description. These functions are not specified in [10] ; each of these functions can be thought of as the decryption operation of a symmetric encryption algorithm in the description below. For ease of exposition, this paper assumes throughout that f (1) , f (2) and f (3) are public knowledge. The initialization step also uses a non-secret number, which is assumed to be the identity of sender A in the following text (and denoted by A). Finally, a secret mask key is used, denoted by SM K. Such a key is shared between all the chips of a particular model, and its value is only known to the corresponding chip manufacturer. Using this notation, the initialization step of K-LAD is defined as follows:
Initialization: generate a secret key K B for each chip B and initialize B with K B . The trusted third party computes a secret key K B,A = f Each chip implements f (1) , f (2) and f (3) , and the value A is distributed to the chips associated with A. Notice that this distribution is bandwidth efficient since this value is shared between all these chips. Next, chip B computes M K B,A using the received value A and its stored keys K B and SM K. Chip B and sender A now share M K B,A . Next, the K-LAD protocol uses the two phases of Protocol 1, using M K B,A instead of M K B in Phase I.
Observe that K B is the secret master key of B in the K-LAD protocol instead of M K B in Protocol 1. The trusted third party in K-LAD manages K B during the lifetime of the corresponding decoder.
KB (A) enables the chip manufacturer to activate the K-LAD functionality in a chip for a particular sender. In addition, if the value of s A is kept secret, then it prevents that the trusted third party can compute M K B,A ; however, using SM K to enhance system security requires that the chip manufacturer is an additional trusted third party in K-LAD. In this case the method can be seen as a form of secret sharing, as neither the trusted third party nor the chip manufacturer have sufficient information to compute M K B,A . For detailed information about K-LAD, refer to [10] .
The Common Interface
The DVB-CI standard EN 50211 [2] defines an interface, referred to as the common interface, between a host and a module. An example of a host is a television with a built in digital tuner and an example of a module is a CA Module (CAM) used for pay-TV. The physical interface between the CAM and the host and the form factor of the CAM as specified in EN 50211 are a variant of the PC Card standard. A CAM is a decoder in that it contains a CA client and a content decryption chip; a difference between a CAM and a set-top box is that a CAM does not contain a digital tuner.
One of the interfaces specified in [2] is the MPEG-2 transport stream. The host uses this interface to send an encrypted transport stream to the CAM. If the CAM is authorized to access the content contained in the transport stream, then the content decryption chip in the CAM decrypts the transport stream and returns the decrypted transport stream to the host. In particular, CI specifies that content is sent unprotected from the CAM to the host. CI Plus [3] is an extension of CI that addresses this vulnerability by securing the transport stream interface between the CAM and the host. CI Plus has been specified by an industry consortium and is backwards compatible with the CI version as specified in [2] .
Annex VI of Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and the Council [4] states that 'Any digital television set with an integral screen of visible diagonal greater than 30 cm which is put on the market for sale or rent in the Community is to be fitted with at least one open interface socket (...) e.g. the DVB common interface connector, (...)', which resulted in the widespread use of CI and CI Plus CAMs in the European Union.
CI and CI Plus do not define the operation of the CA client in a CAM; in particular, the interface between the CA client and the content decryption chip in a CAM is not defined. Consequently, CI and CI Plus are not CA system or pay-TV provider agnostic solutions. In particular, a pay-TV provider typically needs to distribute a new CAM to each host it services if the provider wants to replace the CA system, and a consumer typically needs to acquire a CAM for every pay-TV provider from which the consumer wants to access content.
The new key establishment protocol
This section presents the new key establishment protocol. As in Protocol 1 and the K-LAD protocol, the new protocol enables a sender and a number of receivers selected by the sender to derive a shared secret K. Further, like the K-LAD protocol, the new protocol is sender agnostic in that any sender can execute the protocol with any receiver and no trust relation between senders is assumed.
Two objectives of the new protocol related to a compromise and the re-distribution of the shared secret K are: (1) provide implicit key authentication in that the sender is assured that only authorized receivers have access to the shared secret K, and (2) protect the authenticity of protocol messages in that it is computationally infeasible to find protocol messages that enable a non-authorized receiver that is compliant with the protocol to derive a given shared secret K. Recall that these properties are also satisfied by Protocol 1 and the K-LAD protocol.
The protocol uses a public-key encryption scheme and a digital signature scheme. The use of the encryption scheme relates to the first objective and the use of the signature scheme relates to the second objective. In the following text, the public-key encryption and decryption algorithms are denoted by E and D, respectively. Further, the signature generation algorithm is denoted by S and the signature verification algorithm is denoted by V . For ease of notation, a signature scheme with message recovery is used in the description of the protocol. Instead, a signature scheme with partial message recovery or a signature scheme with appendix can be used. Examples of public-key encryption schemes and digital signature schemes can be found in [11, 12] .
In addition, the protocol uses a function h to derive the shared secret. It is assumed that this function is public knowledge and that given an input to h, the corresponding output is easy to compute. The function is part of the mechanism that protects the authenticity of protocol messages. As detailed in the next sections, the use of h enables each sender to independently generate a master key pair associated with the signature scheme. A choice for h is described in Sect. 3.3.
As shown in the next sections, the combination of h and a public-key encryption scheme results in a protocol in which the trusted third party only needs to manage a public key of each receiver; that is, the trusted third party acts as a certification authority in the new protocol, as detailed in Sect. 3.4. In addition, it will be shown that a receiver needs to be revoked only if the receiver's system is compromised, as a breach in any other system component can be corrected without revoking the receiver.
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 present two variants of the new protocol, referred to as Variant A and Variant B, respectively. Section 4 describes how these variants can be applied in a pay-TV system. As detailed in Sect. 4, the two variants offer different trade-offs between bandwidth usage of CA messages, computational requirements in a decoder and security against control word re-distribution attacks.
Variant A
Variant A of the new protocol is described in Protocol 2. As before, the key of a keyed cryptographic operation is written as a subscript. Figure 2 depicts the protocol steps, with the exception of Step 3. Further, KPG denotes a key pair generator that generates key pairs associated with the signature scheme in Fig. 2 . Without loss of generality, only one receiver is depicted in Fig. 2 .
Protocol 2 (Variant A)
Initialization: generate a key pair (SK B , P K B ) associated with the public-key encryption scheme for each receiver B and initialize B with the secret key SK B . The trusted third party makes an authentic copy of the public key P K B available to each sender A. The public keys of the receivers are stored in a database in Fig. 2 .
Establish shared secret:
A generates or obtains a key pair associated with the signature scheme. The secret key and the public key in this key pair are denoted by SK A and P K A , respectively. 2. A generates a random number r. 3. A computes the shared secret K = h(P K A , r).
For each authorized receiver B:
(a) A computes E P KB (r).
(b) A computes the signature S SKA (E P KB (r)).
(c) A sends to B the values P K A and S SKA (E P KB (r)). (d) B uses the received values to compute V P KA (S SKA (E P KB (r))). If the signature is invalid, then B aborts the protocol. Otherwise, B recovers E P KB (r) from the signature. (e) B computes r = D SKB (E P KB (r)). (f) B computes the shared secret K = h(P K A , r).
As in Protocol 1 and the K-LAD protocol, a receiver is initialized with a unique secret in Protocol 2. The difference is that a public-key encryption scheme is associated with the secret master key of the receiver instead of a symmetric encryption algorithm. The corresponding key pair (SK B , P K B ) is used for protecting the confidentiality of r.
In Step 1 of Protocol 2, A generates or obtains a key pair (SK A , P K A ) that is used to protect the authenticity of protocol messages. The public key P K A of this
pair is distributed to authorized receivers in Step 4c. As indicated, the sender does not necessarily generate a new key pair for every execution of the protocol. Instead, the sender can store (SK A , P K A ) and use this stored pair in future executions of the protocol. Required security properties of h as used in Steps 3 and 4f are:
1. Given a pair (P K A , r), it is computationally infeasible to find a second pair (P K
if r is selected at random and if the value of r is unknown.
If Property 2 is satisfied, then Protocol 2 provides implicit key authentication. To see this, notice that Protocol 2 protects the confidentiality of the random number r, and that Property 2 states that K cannot be found without knowing the value of r. Moreover, a nonauthorized receiver B ′ can only successfully retrieve random numbers that were encrypted using P K B ′ . Further, under the assumption that the value of r is unique for every protocol execution, the sender did not generate E P K B ′ (r) in any of the protocol executions. That is, the sender is assured that only authorized receivers have access to the shared secret K.
Property 1 is required to protect the authenticity of protocol messages in that it is computationally infeasible to find protocol messages that enable a nonauthorized receiver B ′ that is compliant with Protocol 2 to derive a given shared secret K. To see this, suppose that an adversary manages to find two protocol messages with this property. From Property 1 it follows that the two inputs to h associated with these two messages must be P K A and r. This implies that the first message equals P K A and that the input to D associated with the second message must be E P K B ′ (r). In addition, the second message needs to be accepted by the signature verification algorithm using P K A as input. As the protocol provides implicit key authentication, the sender did not generate a suitable second protocol message, implying that the adversary needs to create the second message. However, under the assumption that the signature scheme is secure against signature forgery attacks, it is computationally infeasible to create such a message if the value of SK A is unknown.
Observe that the protection of the authenticity of protocol messages does not depend on the secrecy of r or SK B ′ ; in other words, the authenticity of protocol messages is protected if Property 1 holds and if the value of SK A is unknown. Notice also that SK A is only available to the sender.
Correcting security breaches
If an adversary compromises one or more secrets from the sender's system, then system security can be restored for future protocol executions. To this end, the security of the sender's system should be restored first. Next, if one or more keys SK A are compromised, then these keys should not be used in future executions of the protocol. Instead, the sender can re-use keys SK A that were not compromised or the sender can generate a new key pair in Step 1. New values r and K are generated in every execution of the protocol; that is, if random numbers or shared secrets are compromised, then system security is restored for protocol executions performed after restoring the security of the sender's system. Note that a security breach of the sender's system has no impact on the operations of other senders.
In the application of the new protocol considered in this paper, the security of the system of a receiver cannot be restored after it has been compromised. This paper therefore assumes that senders revoke compromised receivers to restore system security.
If an adversary extracts random numbers or shared secrets from one or more authorized receivers and redistributes these values, then the sender first needs to identify the source of the breach. To this end, a traitor tracing scheme can be used. In a traitor tracing scheme, the sender partitions the set of authorized receivers in every execution of the protocol and uses different values r and/or K for each of the sets in the partition. After a number of protocol executions, the sender can identify the set of compromised receivers; the number of executions depends on the traitor tracing scheme chosen by the sender. In the application considered in this paper, a dynamic traitor tracing scheme can be applied (refer to [6, 23, 15] for examples). For ease of exposition, this paper assumes throughout that the traitor tracing scheme does not accuse innocent users. Recall that the secret key SK B is unique to receiver B; that is, no traitor tracing scheme needs to be applied to identify the source of a compromised and re-distributed SK B . After the set of compromised receivers has been identified, the sender can restore system security by excluding the set of compromised receivers from the set of authorized receivers in future protocol executions, revoking the compromised receivers.
As detailed in Sect. 3.4, the trusted third party can inform other senders that a receiver is compromised to prevent other senders from executing the protocol with compromised receivers.
Variant B
Variant B of the new protocol is described in Protocol 3. This variant is closely related to Variant A. The main difference is that Variant B uses an additional key layer. The key on this layer is a symmetric key and is denoted by LK B . The corresponding encryption and decryption operations are denoted by e and d respectively. Further, B's identity is denoted by B. The protocol steps are depicted in Fig. 3 , with the exception of Step 4.
Protocol 3 (Variant B)
Initialization: generate a key pair (SK B , P K B ) associated with the public-key encryption scheme for each receiver B and initialize B with the secret key SK B . The trusted third party makes an authentic copy of the public key P K B available to each sender A. The public keys of the receivers are stored in a database in Fig. 3 .
I. Establish long-term key: (LK B ) ).
II. Establish shared secret:
3. A generates a random number r. 4. A computes the shared secret K = h(P K A , r).
For each authorized receiver B:
(a) A computes e LKB (r). Similar to Protocol 1 and the K-LAD protocol, Protocol 3 is divided into two phases: in Phase I the sender transports a long-term key to each receiver, and in Phase II the sender uses the long-term keys to establish a shared secret with each authorized receiver. In practice, Phase II is executed a number of times after Phase I is executed, establishing a new shared secret in every execution of Phase II. Other similarities with Protocol 1 and the K-LAD protocol are that a long-term key is a symmetric key and that no public-key operations are used in Phase II of the protocol. A difference with Protocol 1 and the K-LAD protocol is that in Protocol 3 a long-term key is transported using the method as used for transporting r in Protocol 2.
As in Protocol 2, A does not necessarily generate a new key pair (SK A , P K A ) in Step 1 for every execution of Phase I of Protocol 3. Instead, the sender can store a key pair and use this stored pair in future executions of the protocol. This paper assumes that a new long-term key is transported to every receiver associated with A in Phase I. Instead, if a key pair (SK A , P K A ) is reused, then new long-term keys can be transported to a subset of these receivers, and all other receivers can use a long-term key in Phase II that was transported in one of the earlier executions of Phase I associated with this key pair.
If h satisfies Property 2 in Sect. 3.1, then Protocol 3 provides implicit key authentication. To see this, observe that Protocol 3 protects the confidentiality of the random number r, and that Property 2 states that K cannot be found without knowing the value of r. Moreover, a non-authorized receiver B ′ can only successfully retrieve long-term keys that were encrypted Fig. 3 Key establishment protocol -Variant B.
using P K B ′ , and as a consequence, B ′ can only successfully retrieve random numbers that were encrypted using one of the keys LK B ′ . Further, under the assumption that the value of r is unique for every execution of Phase II, the sender did not generate e LK B ′ (r) in any of the protocol executions. As a result, the sender is assured that only authorized receivers have access to the shared secret K.
With respect to the protection of the authenticity of protocol messages, suppose that an adversary manages to find three protocol messages that enable a nonauthorized receiver B ′ that is compliant with Protocol 3 to derive a given shared secret K. From Property 1 it follows that the two inputs to h associated with these three messages must be P K A and r. This implies that the first message equals P K A and that the adversary needs to obtain or create two additional messages m 1 and m 2 such that the input to D associated with m 1 equals E P K B ′ (LK) for some LK and such that d LK (m 2 ) = r. Further, m 1 needs to be accepted by the signature verification algorithm using P K A as input. Under the assumption that the signature scheme is secure against signature forgery attacks, it is computationally infeasible to create m 1 if the value of the secret key SK A is unknown. Further, as the identity of a receiver is included in a signed protocol message and verified by every receiver, the only option for the adversary is to use a protocol message S SKA (B ′ , E P K B ′ (LK B ′ )) as generated by the sender in Step 2c and distributed to B ′ in Step 2d in one of the executions of Phase I of the protocol associated with (SK A , P K A ) as m 1 . This implies that m 2 = e LK B ′ (r). As the protocol provides implicit key authentication, the sender did not generate e LK B ′ (r). This implies that the adversary needs to create m 2 , which is computationally infeasible if the value of LK B ′ is unknown.
Note that the protection of the authenticity of protocol messages does not depend on the secrecy of r; in other words, the authenticity of protocol messages is protected as long as the value of SK A and the values of LK B ′ associated with SK A are unknown.
Correcting security breaches
As in Protocol 2, a security breach of the sender's system can be corrected without revoking any receiver and such a breach has no impact on the operations of other senders. The sender should first restore the security of their system to correct the breach. New values r and K are generated in every execution of Phase II of the protocol; that is, if random numbers or shared secrets are compromised, then system security is restored for protocol executions performed after restoring the security of the sender's system. If SK A is compromised, then an adversary can use this key to create a message S SKA (B, E P KB (LK)) for some chosen key LK and some chosen receiver B. If LK B is compromised from the sender's system, then the adversary has access to the corresponding signed protocol message containing this key (as the sender generated and distributed this message during the execution of Phase I in which LK B was generated). In particular, the adversary can use such messages to enable B to derive a given K in a protocol execution that is associated with SK A and in which B is a non-authorized receiver. To prevent this in future protocol executions, the sender can execute Phase II of the protocol associated with an execution of Phase I for which no keys have been compromised. Alternatively, the sender can execute Phase I of the protocol, generating a new key pair in Step 1.
If an adversary extracts one or more secrets from one or more receivers and re-distributes these secrets, then the sender can revoke the compromised receivers to restore system security. Similar reasoning as for Protocol 2 applies if these secrets are random numbers or shared secrets. Observe that the sender only needs to execute Phase II of the protocol during the tracing process. The secret keys SK B and LK B are unique to B; that is, no traitor tracing scheme needs to be applied to identify the source of a compromised and re-distributed SK B or LK B .
After the set of compromised receivers is identified, the sender can restore system security by executing the protocol, updating the key pair (SK A , P K A ) in Step 1 and excluding the set of compromised receivers from the set of receivers in Step 2 and from the set of authorized receivers in Step 5. This revokes the compromised receivers. To see this, note that random numbers and shared secrets cannot be found using compromised receivers after they are excluded from the set of authorized receivers. Further, an adversary cannot create messages signed with the updated SK A , and a protocol message signed by the sender using the updated SK A and distributed to a non-compromised receiver in
Step 2d will not be accepted by a compromised receiver, as the identity of a receiver is included in a such a message and verified by every receiver in Step 2e. This prevents an adversary from finding messages that enable a compromised receiver to derive a given shared secret K associated with the updated (SK A , P K A ). Notice that this property can also be achieved by adding redundancy to the long-term key before encrypting it and by letting each receiver verify this redundancy.
A choice for h
This section describes a choice for a function h satisfying Properties 1 and 2 as listed in Sect. 3.1. In the following discussion, security strength (or 'bits of security') is defined as in [22] : 'A number associated with the amount of work (that is, the number of operations) that is required to break a cryptographic algorithm or system. If 2 N execution operations of the algorithm (or system) are required to break the cryptographic algorithm, then the security strength is N bits.' If the length of the shared secret K is n bits, then the example described in this section is intended to provide n bits of security with respect to Properties 1 and 2.
Property 1 is related to the second preimage resistance property of a cryptographic hash function (see e.g. [17] ). However, h has two inputs instead of a single input in case of a cryptographic hash function. To address this, the input to the cryptographic hash function can be defined as the concatenation of the representations of the two inputs to h. For instance, if the cryptographic hash function is denoted by H and if a concatenation is denoted by ||, then h can be defined as h(P K A , r) := H(r||P K A ). If P K A and r are represented by fixed-length bit strings, then the second preimage resistance property of H implies Property 1.
If different outputs of h are used as input to different cryptographic algorithms or mechanisms in an application of the new protocol, then an additional input to h identifying the algorithm or mechanism can be used to prevent attacks based on key misuse. For example, if this identifier is denoted by ID and represented by a fixed-length bit string, then h can be defined as h(P K A , r, ID) := H(r||ID||P K A ). An ID can be included in the corresponding protocol messages that are signed by the sender to protect the authenticity of ID during its distribution to receivers (notice that for Protocol 3 this assumes that the outputs of h are input to one algorithm or mechanism for all random numbers r that are associated with an execution of Phase I).
From the discussion above it follows that the length of the output of H equals n bits and that the intended security strength of H is also n bits. In general, the expected second preimage resistance of a cryptographic hash function equals the bit-length of its output (the output of a hash function is also referred to as the message digest in the following text). That is, H is expected to provide n bits of security with respect to Property 1.
It is widely believed and assumed that a 'good' cryptographic hash function behaves as a random function and any deviation from this behavior is usually considered a certificational weakness in the design of the hash function. This belief has lead to the widespread use of cryptographic hash functions for purposes other than that for which they were originally designed (see e.g. [16] for an overview).
For example, cryptographic hash functions are commonly used as key derivation functions (see e.g. [20, 21] ). One of the requirements for the hash function used in the key derivation functions in [20, 21] is that it should be computationally infeasible to find one or more derived keys if the value of the secret part of its input is unknown. If H satisfies this requirement, then h satisfies Property 2. Similar to the hash function used in the key derivation functions in [20, 21] , Property 2 is expected to be satisfied for the example above if H behaves as a random function and if the bit-length of r and the value of n are sufficiently large.
In terms of security strength, and similar to the discussion in [22] concerning the security strength of the key derivation functions in [20, 21] : if H behaves as a random function and if the shared secret K shall have a security strength of n bits with respect to Property 2, then the bit-length of r shall be equal to or larger than n.
In conclusion, h can be based on a cryptographic hash function with a message digest of n bits, and the bit-length of r shall be equal to or larger than n if the method is intended to provide n bits of security with respect to Properties 1 and 2.
Observe that in the new protocol the hash function is used to protect the authenticity of protocol messages, and not as a key derivation function as in [20, 21] . Two differences between the required properties of the hash function in the new protocol and the hash function in [20, 21] are worthy of note. First, second preimage resistance is not a required property of the hash function in [20, 21] . Second, the hash function in the new protocol uses a fresh random number r for every shared secret K, instead of deriving multiple keys from a single secret as in [20, 21] . In particular, one of the requirements for the hash function used in [20, 21] is partial-preimage resistance with respect to the secret part of its input, as it should be computationally infeasible to find the derived secret keying material if the value of one of the corresponding message digests is known (refer to [20, 21] for detailed information).
Partial-preimage resistance with respect to its secret input r is not a required property of H. However, it can be a useful property. To see this, recall from Sects. 3.1 and 3.2 that an adversary needs to know the value of r to find protocol messages that enable a non-authorized receiver to derive the corresponding K. If H is partialpreimage resistant with respect to r, then an adversary cannot compute r from K. This can provide an additional layer of security with respect to the protection of the authenticity of protocol messages. For example, this is the case in implementations of the new protocol in which compromising random numbers is more difficult than compromising shared secrets. In such implementations, a function H satisfying the additional partial-preimage resistance property may also be used to derive multiple shared secrets from a single random number (e.g. by using a counter as part of the input to H; see also [20, 21] 
).
A choice for H Most cryptographic hash functions are designed to also offer collision resistance to enable the use of the hash function in a wide range of cryptographic applications. In general, the expected collision resistance strength of a cryptographic hash function is half the bit-length of its message digest. As a result, the bit-length of the message digest of a modern hash function is typically larger than the value of n (notice that collision resistance is not a required property of H, as the adversary has no control over the input to H in the cryptographic application in this paper). For instance, the length of a SHA-512 [18] message digest equals 512 bits, and if the output of H is a CSA v3 key, then n equals 128 bits. To address this, a modern hash function with a truncated message digest can be used as a choice for H. For example, H can be defined as SHA-512 with an n-bit truncated message digest (see e.g. [22] ). Based on the second preimage attacks presented in [13] , [22] states that the actual second preimage resistance strength of SHA-512 with such an n-bit truncated message digest is equal to min{n, 512 − log 2 ( maximum input length in bits 2 10 )} bits, which is equal to n for all values of the maximum input length that can occur in the applications of the hash function in this paper and for all common symmetric key lengths. In addition, SHA-512 is one of the approved hash functions for use in the key derivation functions in [20, 21] ; that is, SHA-512 (or SHA-512 with a truncated message digest as defined in [22] ) is assumed to behave as a random function in [20, 21] . In conclusion, H as defined above can be used to derive an n-bit shared secret K for all common symmetric key lengths, and the bit-length of r shall be equal to or larger than n if the method is intended to provide n bits of security with respect to Properties 1 and 2.
The expected partial-preimage resistance strength of H as defined above is n bits; that is, this function can also be used in implementations in which partialpreimage resistance is desired.
The role of the trusted third party
Recall from the descriptions of Protocols 2 and 3 that each receiver B is initialized with a unique secret key SK B associated with the public-key encryption scheme. In practice, B may create its own key pair (SK B , P K B ) and securely transfer its public key P K B and its identity to the trusted third party, e.g. using registered mail or a trusted courier to protect the authenticity of this information.
An authentic copy of P K B needs to be available to sender A to enable A to execute the new protocol with B. A common approach for protecting the authenticity of P K B is to let the trusted third party certify P K B by binding it to B's identity, producing a signed certificate. The trusted third party requires their own signature key pair to sign certificates. The public key of this pair is securely transfered to all senders, protecting its authenticity. Next, B's certificate is made available to all senders that wish to execute the protocol with B. For instance, the trusted third party can create a certificate in real-time upon request of a sender and distribute this certificate to the sender. Alternatively, the trusted third party can maintain a public database to publish certificates, enabling senders to acquire certificates from this database. In this case, the trusted third party can be off-line. After receiving B's certificate, the sender can verify the authenticity of P K B by verifying the signature of the certificate, using the public key of the trusted third party.
The trusted third party can also manage the revocation of certificates. More precisely, after identifying that one or more secrets are compromised from B, the trusted third party can revoke the certificate of B, thereby informing all senders that this receiver is compromised. This allows all senders to revoke B from their operations (see also Sects. 3.1 and 3.2). Observe that revocation of a certificate can be handled easily in case of an on-line trusted third party that creates certificates in real-time. If a public database is used, then revocation of a certificate can be performed by including an expiration date in the certificate, or by using a certificate revocation list.
Note that the trusted third party must be trusted not to issue false certificates, but that the trusted third party does not need to know the values of the secret master keys of the receivers.
Summarizing, the trusted third party in the new protocol acts as a certification authority. For detailed information about certification authorities, refer to [17] .
Correcting security breaches
If an adversary compromises the certificate authority's secret key, then the adversary can issue counterfeit certificates. Next, the adversary can use the counterfeit certificates to act as one or more receivers in the protocol, enabling the adversary to access and re-distribute secrets (such as random numbers or shared secrets) which are protected using the public keys of the counterfeit certificates. However, observe that the adversary cannot use the certificate authority's secret key (i.e. counterfeit certificates) to impersonate a legitimate receiver. That is, if the steps as described in Sects. 3.1 and 3.2 are used in an attempt to correct a breach in which secrets are re-distributed, then a legitimate and non-compromised receiver will not be identified as a traitor and will not be revoked. However, the steps described in Sects. 3.1 and 3.2 are not sufficient to correct a breach in which the certificate authority's secret key is compromised, as the adversary can issue new counterfeit certificates after other counterfeit certificates have been revoked.
Observe that a compromise of the certification authority's secret key invalidates certificates, but not the master key pair of a receiver. The certification authority can first restore the security of their system and update their signature key pair to correct the breach. Next, the updated public key can be securely transfered to the senders, and certificates can be re-issued using the updated secret key. Alternatively, the certificates from the compromised certification authority may be replaced with new certificates from a different certification authority. Next, senders can execute the protocol using new certificates only. Since no key of a certification authority is built into a receiver, a compromise of the certificate's authority's secret key can can be corrected without revoking any receiver.
From the discussion above and the discussions in Sects. 3.1 and 3.2, it follows that a receiver needs to be revoked only if the receiver's system is compromised, as a breach in any other system component can be corrected without revoking the receiver.
Application in pay-TV systems
Examples of how Variant A and Variant B of the new protocol can be applied in a pay-TV system are presented in Sects. 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. In the examples, sender A comprises a CA system and components in the head-end system that are shared between interoperating CA systems. Further, receiver B is a content decryption chip in a decoder associated with A, and K is a control word generated by A. Each of the example applications describes which of the protocol steps are performed by the shared components in the head-end system, the CA components in the head-end system, and the CA clients respectively. The communications from the CA components to the CA clients are also detailed in both examples, and practical aspects (i.e. bandwidth usage of CA messages, computational requirements in a decoder, and security against control word re-distribution attacks) of the two example applications and the K-LAD protocol are compared throughout Sects. 4.1 and 4.2. Aspects of the trusted third parties of the new protocol and the K-LAD protocol are compared in Sect. 4.3.
The examples in Sects. 4.1 and 4.2 assume that a single control word K is derived from each random number r. Further, it is assumed that it is easy for an adversary to find the value of r if the value of the corresponding K is known. The examples use a single CA system in the head-end system; interoperability between CA systems at a head-end is discussed in Sect. 4.4. As in DVB SimulCrypt, the examples in Sects. 4.1 and 4.2 keep the number of secret keys used outside the CA components in the head-end system as small as possible, while still facilitating interoperability. Figure 4 depicts an example application of Variant A as described in Protocol 2. As shown in the figure, Steps 1 -3 of the protocol are performed inside the head-end system of the provider, where the control word K is used to encrypt content. As detailed later in Sect. 4.4, two or more CA systems can interoperate at a headend if a compliant CA system has access to the public key P K A and the random number r and if a legacy CA system (that is, a CA system as described in Sect. 2.1) has access to K. For this reason, Steps 2 and 3 of the protocol are not performed by the CA components and P K A is an output of the CA component that performs Step 1.
Variant A
The public key P K A is distributed to the CA clients of authorized decoders, as this key needs to be distributed to the chips of authorized decoders in Step 4c. Observe that P K A does not need to be protected during its distribution.
The CA system needs access to the random numbers r as generated by the RNG in Step 2 and to the public key P K B of each authorized chip B to perform
Step 4a of the protocol. The random number is therefore input to the CA components, and it is assumed that a database containing authentic public keys associated with the chips of non-revoked decoders is available to the CA components, as shown in Fig. 4 . Recall from Sect. 3 that these public keys are obtained from the trusted third party. Further, recall that the value of P K B is unique for every chip B. This implies that the values E P KB (r) and S SKA (E P KB (r)) as computed in Steps 4a and 4b are unique for every authorized chip B. Further, as indicated in Sect. 2.1, K is updated every 5 to 10 s, which implies that r is also updated every 5 to 10 s. Due to bandwidth limitations for sending CA messages in a pay-TV system, the values E P KB (r) or S SKA (E P KB (r)) cannot be distributed from the headend system to the CA clients of authorized decoders. To address this, the head-end system can distribute the values SK A , P K B and r to the CA client associated with B (see also Fig. 4) . Next, the CA client performs Steps 4a and 4b, and passes the value S SKA (E P KB (r)) to B in Step 4c. This reduces the amount of information that needs to be distributed from the head-end system to the CA clients, as SK A and r are shared between all the CA clients and as the value of P K B remains constant during the lifetime of B.
Observe that the example application of Variant A requires public-key operations in the CA client and in the content decryption chip of an authorized decoder for every control word. Implementations of public-key algorithms are available in current generations of CA systems and content decryption chips. Such implementations indicate that it feasible to perform these operations within 5 s.
The public key P K B can be distributed to the CA client associated with B using an EMM. If a publickey encryption scheme based on elliptic curves is used (see e.g. [11] ), then the size of P K B is small compared to the maximum size of 256 bytes of an EMM. The authenticity of P K B must be protected during its distribution. Further, P K B must be protected in such a way that only the CA client associated with B is able to use P K B . This prevents a CA client of an authorized decoder from using P K B ′ to generate a protocol message S SKA (E P K B ′ (r)) for a non-authorized chip B ′ . The random number r and the corresponding key pair (SK A , P K A ) can be included in an ECM instead of K in legacy CA systems. If a signature scheme based on elliptic curves is used (see e.g. [11] ), then the size of (SK A , P K A ) is small compared to the maximum size of 256 bytes of an ECM. The confidentiality of r and SK A can be protected with a method as used for protecting the confidentiality of K in legacy CA systems to ensure that only CA clients of authorized decoders have access to r and SK A .
Recall from Sect. 3.1 that in Variant A an adversary is able to find protocol messages that enable a nonauthorized chip B ′ to derive a given K only if the value of the corresponding SK A is known to the adversary. As this key is not available to any content decryption chip, the adversary cannot find such messages if only content decryption chips are compromised.
Correcting security breaches Section 3.1 described how security breaches can be corrected for Variant A. However, in a pay-TV application the CA clients are part of the sender. As a result, the following aspect is specific to this application and is not covered by the general discussion in Sect. 3.1.
Observe that SK A and r are available to the CA client of an authorized decoder, and recall that K can be computed if the value of r is known. If an adversary compromises one or more decoders and re-distributes values SK A , r or K, then the pay-TV provider may first try to restore the security of the sender's system by updating their CA clients or by replacing their CA system (refer to Sect. 3.1 for the additional steps that need to be taken to restore system security after the security of the sender's system is restored). Alternatively, or additionally if this did not correct the breach, the pay-TV provider can trace and revoke the compromised decoders.
Comparison with K-LAD
The public-key operations performed for every control word in Variant A are more time-consuming than the corresponding symmetric operations in the K-LAD protocol. In addition, each control word is derived using the function h in the new protocol. Recall from Sect. 3.3 that h can be based on a cryptographic hash function like SHA-512. Such a dedicated hash function has a high performance compared to a public-key operation.
The information that needs to be distributed using CA messages in Variant A comprises: (1) a random number r for every control word K, (2) a public key P K B for every content decryption chip, and (3) a key pair (SK A , P K A ) for every execution of the protocol. Recall from Sect. 3.3 that the bit-length of r can be equal to the bit-length of K, implying that the amount of information associated with (1) can be equal to the amount of information associated with K in K-LAD. With respect to (2) and (3): the K-LAD protocol as described in Sect. 2 requires the distribution of the values e MKB,A (LK B ) and LK B for every content decryption chip and for every execution of Phase I of the K-LAD protocol. The total amount of information associated with (2) and (3) will therefore generally be small compared to the amount of information that needs to be distributed in the K-LAD protocol.
In K-LAD, an adversary is able to create protocol messages that enable a non-authorized chip B ′ to derive a given K if the value of a long-term key LK B ′ or the value of M K B ′ ,A is known to the adversary. If the adversary compromises keys from decoders, then in K-LAD the attack has to be repeated for every compliant decoder to which the adversary wishes to re-distribute control words, instead of compromising SK A from only one decoder in Variant A of the new protocol. However, notice that in K-LAD the keys LK B ′ and M K B ′ are available to the content decryption chip in the decoder, and recall that SK A is not available to any chip in the new protocol. Moreover, recall that the CA clients can be updated or replaced to restore the security of the sender's system, and recall from Sect. 3.1 that updating the key pair (SK A , P K A ) enables a pay-TV provider to revoke a compromised SK A without revoking any chip (i.e. without revoking any decoder). Figure 5 depicts an example application of Variant B as described in Protocol 3. Only the differences compared to the example application of Variant A are described below.
Variant B
Recall from Sect. 3.2 that, compared to Variant A, Variant B uses an additional key layer and that the key LK B associated with this key layer is only updated during the execution of Phase I of the protocol. This implies that the total number of values S SKA (B, E P KB (LK B )) as computed in Step 2c during the executions of Protocol 3 is small compared to the total number of values S SKA (E P KB (r)) computed in Variant A, making it feasible to distribute the values S SKA (B, E P KB (LK B )) from the CA components at the head-end to the CA clients using CA messages. Steps 2a -2c can therefore be performed by the CA components (as shown in Fig. 5 ).
In particular, this means that the secret key SK A only needs to be available to the CA components at the head-end and not to any decoder. This is an advantage compared to the example application of Variant A, as it is generally more difficult for an adversary to compro-
e LK B (r) mise a key from a head-end system than to compromise a key from a decoder. In addition, no traitor tracing scheme is required to trace the source of compromised keys SK A in Variant B. Like the value S SKA (E P KB (r)) in Variant A, the value e LKB (r) as computed in Step 5a of Protocol 3 is updated every 5 to 10 s and this value is unique for every authorized chip B. Due to bandwidth limitations for sending CA messages, Step 5a is performed by the CA client associated with B, which passes the value e LKB (r) to B in Step 5b. As shown in Fig. 5 , the key LK B associated with the value S SKA (B, E P KB (LK B )) is distributed to the CA client to enable the CA client to perform this computation.
Observe that the CA client does not perform any public-key operations in this example, which is an additional advantage compared to the example application of Variant A. In addition, chip B only needs to perform such operations when deriving long-term key LK B from S SKA (B, E P KB (LK B )) in Steps 2e and 2f. Next, the chip can store LK B , and use this stored key in the corresponding executions of Phase II. Compared to Variant A, this reduces the number of public-key operations that need to be performed by the chip.
In the example application of Variant B, the values S SKA (B, E P KB (LK B )) and LK B need to be distributed to the CA client associated with B, instead of the values SK A and P K B in the example application of Variant A. These values can be distributed to the CA client using an EMM. As these values are unique for every decoder and for every execution of Phase I of the protocol, Variant B will generally require more bandwidth for distributing CA messages than Variant A. However, as detailed later, the bandwidth usage of Variant B is comparable to the bandwidth usage of the K-LAD protocol. Moreover, if schemes based on elliptic curves are used, and if a signature scheme with message recovery (or partial message recovery) is used, then the size of S SKA (B, E P KB (LK B )) is small compared to the maximum size of 256 bytes of an EMM.
Recall from Sect. 3.2 that in Variant B an adversary is able to find protocol messages that enable a non-authorized chip B ′ to derive a given K only if the value of the corresponding SK A is known to the adversary or if the value of LK B ′ of a protocol message S SKA (B ′ , E P K B ′ (LK B ′ )) generated by the sender is known. SK A is only available to the CA components at the head-end in the example application of Variant B; in other words, SK A cannot be compromised from a decoder. If long-term keys are compromised from decoders, then this attack needs to be repeated for every compliant decoder to which the adversary wishes to redistribute compromised control words, which can make such an attack too expensive for the adversary. Note that a long-term key can be compromised from the chip or from the CA client in a decoder.
By comparison, in Variant A the adversary cannot find messages that enable a non-authorized chip B ′ to derive a given K if only content decryption chips are compromised, but the adversary can create such messages for any compliant chip if only one CA client is compromised.
Correcting security breaches Section 3.2 described how security breaches can be corrected for Variant B. The following aspect is specific to the example application of Variant B and is not covered by the general discussion in Sect. 3.2.
Similar to the example application of Variant A, if an adversary compromises one or more decoders and re-distributes values LK B , r or K, then the pay-TV provider may first try to restore the security of the sender's system by updating their CA clients or by replacing their CA system (refer to Sect. 3.2 for the additional steps that need to be taken to restore system security after the security of the sender's system is restored). Alternatively, or additionally if this did not correct the breach, the pay-TV provider can trace and revoke the compromised decoders.
Comparison with K-LAD
As is the case with K-LAD, the example application of Variant B does not require public-key operations in a CA client. Moreover, Phase II of Variant B and Phase II of K-LAD have similar computational requirements; the difference is that each control word is derived using the function h in the new protocol.
The information that needs to be distributed using CA messages in Variant B comprises: (1) a random number r for every control word K, (2) the public key P K A of a key pair (SK A , P K A ) for every execution of Phase I of the protocol, and (3) a value S SKA (B, E P KB (LK B )) along with a copy of LK B for every content decryption chip and every execution of Phase I of the protocol. Recall from Sect. 4.1 that (1) does not cause any overhead if the bit-length of r is equal to the bit-length of K. Further, observe that the total amount of information associated with (2) will generally be negligible to the total amount of information associated with (3), because P K A is shared between all the content decryption chips. By comparison, the K-LAD protocol as described in Sect. 2 requires the distribution of the values e MKB,A (LK B ) and LK B for every content decryption chip and for every execution of Phase I. Assuming an equal number of executions of Phase I in K-LAD and in Variant B, the number of values e MKB,A (LK B ) and LK B in K-LAD will be equal to the number of values associated with (3); however, as public-key techniques are used in the new protocol, the size of S SKA (B, E P KB (LK B )) will be larger than the size of e MKB,A (LK B ). The increase in size can be limited if schemes based on elliptic curves are used, and if a signature scheme with message recovery (or partial message recovery) is used.
If an adversary compromises keys from decoders, then Variant B and the K-LAD protocol both require that the attack is repeated for each compliant decoder to which the adversary wishes to re-distribute compromised control words. In addition, long-term key LK B is available to both chip B and the CA client associated with B in both protocols. A difference with the K-LAD protocol is that LK B is associated with a particular key pair (SK A , P K A ) in Variant B. Recall from Sect. 3.2 that updating this key pair enables a pay-TV provider to revoke the key SK A or LK B without revoking any chip (i.e. decoder) if such a key was compromised from the CA system. Moreover, as also described in Sect. 3.2, it enables a pay-TV provider to revoke compromised chips.
Comparison between the trusted third parties
Recall from Sect. 2.4 that each K-LAD compliant chip B is initialized with a unique secret master key K B . Further, if sender A wishes to execute the K-LAD protocol with B, then the trusted third party computes the secret key K B,A = f KB (A) and distributes K B,A to A. The key management required for distributing K B,A to A is more complicated than the key management required for distributing the public key P K B to A in the new protocol, as not only the authenticity of K B,A needs to be protected, but also its confidentiality. Moreover, the number of keys K B,A is linear in the number of senders in K-LAD, instead of one key P K B per chip in the new protocol. This scaling property can make the use of a public database (i.e. an off-line trusted third party) for distributing the keys K B,A to senders challenging in case of a large number of senders.
The value of the secret master key K B of each chip B is known to the trusted third party in K-LAD. Recall from Sect. 2.4 that K B,A can be computed for any sender A if the value of K B is known. Further, recall that the value of SM K needs to be known to compute s A and M K B,A , and that the value of SM K is only known to the chip manufacturer. As indicated in Sect. 2.4, this method can be seen as a form of secret sharing if the chip manufacturer is an additional trusted third party in K-LAD and if the value of s A is kept secret. Notice that the trusted third party or parties in K-LAD have access to all secrets in the system, and that these parties must be trusted not to disclose any of those secrets or to impersonate legitimate chips when such secrets are disclosed. By comparison, the trusted third party in the new protocol must be trusted not to issue false certificates, but cannot impersonate chip B if the value of SK B is unknown to the trusted third party.
Concluding, the key management required for distributing K B,A to senders in K-LAD is more complicated than the key management required for distributing P K B to senders in the new protocol, and a higher level of trust is required in the trusted third party in K-LAD.
The secret master keys and the secret mask keys need to be available to the system of the trusted third party and the system of the chip manufacturer, respectively. If an adversary compromises the values of K B and SM K from these systems, then chip B (i.e. the decoder containing chip B) needs to be revoked or replaced to restore system security. By comparison, in both variants of the new protocol a decoder needs to be revoked only if its chip is compromised, as a breach in any other system component can be corrected without revoking the decoder. As a result, the risk that the decoder, or the content rendering device if the decoder is integrated in the device, of an honest consumer needs to be revoked to restore system security is lower in the new protocol.
Interoperability between CA systems
The discussion below assumes, without loss of generality, that two CA systems interoperate at the head-end. Each of these CA systems is associated with a sender as defined in Sect. 3. Both these senders execute the new protocol independently with their decoders, with the exception of the steps in which the random number r is generated and in which the control word K is computed; these steps are shared between the senders. The random number is provided as input to the CA components of both CA systems.
To avoid the need for sharing the secret keys SK A between the CA systems, the two public keys as output by the CA components of the two CA systems (see also Figs. 4 and 5) can be provided as input to h instead of one public key. The properties of h and the choice for h as described in Sect. 3 can easily be adapted to this scenario. Observe that this implies that the chip in a decoder also need access to both these public keys in order to derive control words. As a decoder is typically associated with one CA system only, the public key of one CA system needs to be available to the other CA system, which can then distribute this key to its decoders. As the two public keys are shared between all the decoders, this will only cause a minor increase in bandwidth usage for each of the CA systems.
In the description of the new protocol in Sect. 3, a security breach of a sender's system has no impact on the operation of another sender. This no longer holds true if the CA systems associated with these senders interoperate at a head-end and if one or more values r, K or SK A are compromised. The steps that can be taken to correct such a breach are similar to the steps described in Sects. 4.1 and 4.2; however, if SK A of one of the CA systems is compromised, and if the corresponding key pair is updated to correct the breach, then the public key of this updated key pair also needs to be distributed to the other CA system and their decoders before system security can be restored.
As the new protocol is CA system agnostic, the provider can decide to replace the CA clients of one interoperating CA system with CA clients of the other interoperating CA system (or to replace all the CA clients with CA clients of third compliant CA system), after which the interoperation of CA systems at the head-end is no longer required.
Remark 1 (Legacy CA systems) If a legacy CA system interoperates with a compliant CA system at the headend, then the control words K are input to the CA components of the legacy CA system (see also Fig. 1 ) and the corresponding random numbers r are input to the CA components of the compliant CA system (see also Figs. 4 and 5). For example, this scenario applies if a pay-TV provider gradually replaces legacy decoders with compliant decoders in their population.
Remark 2 (Trust relations)
A CA system supplier does not need to know the value of any key when the new protocol is applied in a pay-TV system. Consequently, no trust relation is required between different CA system suppliers. It follows from the discussions in Sects. 3 and 4.4 that a trust relation between different senders in the new protocol is required only if the CA systems associated with these senders interoperate at a head-end. That is, if a head-end system is operated by a single pay-TV provider, then no trust relation is required between this provider and other providers. If a head-end system is operated by multiple pay-TV providers, then there already is a trust relation between these providers, as they share the control words used for encrypting the content.
Concluding remarks
In Sect. 3, a new key establishment protocol was presented. The protocol does not require a trust relation between senders, and enables any sender and a number of receivers as selected by the sender to derive a shared secret. The protocol provides implicit key authentication and uses a cryptographic hash function as part of a mechanism that protects the authenticity of protocol messages. It was shown that the combination of the hash function and a public-key encryption scheme results in a protocol in which the trusted third party only needs to manage a public key of each receiver, and in which a receiver needs to revoked only if the receiver's system is compromised, as a breach in any other system component can be corrected without revoking the receiver.
Section 4 described how the two variants of the new protocol as presented in Sects. 3.1 and 3.2 can be applied in a pay-TV system. In particular, it was shown that the two variants offer different trade-offs between bandwidth usage of CA messages, computational requirements in a decoder and security against control word re-distribution attacks, and that these properties are similar for the second variant and the K-LAD protocol.
As in the K-LAD protocol, a decoder that is compliant with the new protocol is both CA system and pay-TV provider agnostic, enabling a pay-TV provider to replace the CA system without replacing deployed decoders and enabling a consumer to use the decoder for accessing content of multiple pay-TV providers. Such a decoder may be integrated into a content rendering device such as a television, a tablet or a mobile device. This avoids the need for a separate decoder such as a set-top box or a PC Card in case of CI and CI Plus and the need for a high-bandwidth physical interface between the decoder and the content rendering device.
The trusted third party in the new protocol acts as a certification authority. Compared to K-LAD, this simplifies key management and reduces the level of trust required in the trusted third party. In addition, the new protocol has the desirable property that a decoder needs to be revoked only if its chip is compromised. This reduces the risk that the decoder, or the content rendering device if the decoder is integrated in the device, of an honest consumer needs to be revoked to restore system security.
